China is experiencing an unprecedented urban revolution, with massive ruralto-urban migration. Owing to the discriminatory hukou system, millions of migrants are excluded from accessing subsidized housing and suffer severe housing poverty. How to provide decent and affordable housing to migrants is an unprecedented challenge in China. In this paper we aim to scrutinize the current migrant housing provision system and migrants' housing conditions, and provide policy recommendations for a theoretically informed and empirically grounded migrant housing provision system. On the basis of both a conceptual analysis of migrant housing provision during rapid urbanization and an empirical study of migrant housing provision in China, we argue for a governmentled multiagent migrant housing provision system with the government, employers, and the formal and informal housing markets together providing a diverse stock of migrant housing. Related reforms in the land system and public finance system are recommended to ensure the sustainability of the migrant housing provision system.
Introduction
China is in the midst of an urban revolution, with hundreds of millions of rural-to-urban migrants every year in the last three decades.
(1) Yet, with the discriminatory household registration (hukou) system, migrants continue to be treated as being 'temporary' and 'illegal' in cities, and they are denied access to welfare benefits such as subsidized housing (eg, Chan, 1994; 1996; Cheng and Selden, 1994) . China has made spectacular achievements in urban housing in recent decades, with the rate of homeownership increasing from 20% in the 1980s to 70% in 2010, and per capita living space increasing from 4 m 2 to 29 m 2 (Huang and Clark, 2002; Yi and Huang, 2012 ). Yet, millions of migrants have completely been left out of this 'Chinese dream'.
With their sheer volume and marginalized position, migrants have gained much scholarly attention. There is a large literature on migrants regarding the impact of the hukou system, migration pattern, their socioeconomic attainment, and marginalization (eg, Chan, 1994; 1996; Fan, 2008; Fang and Huang, 1998; Jacka, 2006; Solinger, 1999 ). Yet, only recently have scholars started to examine migrants' housing rights and housing condition in cities. Constrained by the hukou system, migrants without registration in cities are not allowed to access formal housing, especially those in the public sector. Many migrant workers, especially those employed in the manufacturing and service sectors, live in temporary, crowded, and poor-quality housing provided by their employers such as factory dorms, shacks, and construction sites (eg, Solinger, 1999; Wang et al, 2010; Wu, 2004; Zeng et al, 2009 ). While being free or cheap, employer-provided housing often lacks privacy, discourages the formation of families, and causes practical and psychological problems, which are becoming increasingly common among migrants. The second option is private rental housing. Given their low income and the increasingly high housing prices in Chinese cities, migrants often live in very small, poor-quality housing and share with others to save rent Zeng et al, 2009) . They also tend to live in marginalized communities such as the so-called 'urban villages' (cheng zhong cun) (2) that often lie at the outskirts of the city (Ma and Xiang, 1998 ). Yet, they often have to pay relatively high rent for housing (Zeng et al, 2009 ). Thus, crowding, poor quality, the lack of options and amenities, and low affordability are common problems in migrant housing.
The appalling condition of migrant housing, in sharp contrast to the significant housing improvement among permanent urban residents, is increasingly considered a potential threat to social stability. With ongoing urbanization, the current practice of denying their 'rights to the city' is no longer politically and practically justified. How to accommodate the massive influx of migrants with decent and affordable housing has become an urgent task for the government to ensure social justice and political stability and to facilitate further urbanization. In 2006 the State Council (2006) for the first time in history recognized the need to improve migrants' housing condition. In 2010 the Ministry of Housing and UrbanRural Development (MOHURD, 2010) mentioned for the first time that qualified migrants may be able to access 'public rental housing' (gonggong zulin fang), (3) and the Minister of Agriculture even stated that migrants should be included in all subsidized housing programs (MOA, 2010) . While modest, these changes in the government's attitude demonstrate the urgent need to provide decent and affordable housing to migrants, and to incorporate migrants into the formal housing system. The question is 'how'.
The main goal of this paper is to provide both theoretical and empirical grounds for sound migrant housing policy in Chinese cities. With the rapidly rising housing prices, housing affordability has become one of the most important problems affecting households' welfare, and more so among migrants. Yet existing low-income housing programs in Chinese cities exclude migrants, which makes them even more vulnerable on the housing market. How to provide affordable housing to millions of migrants is an unprecedented challenge for China. In this paper we aim to contribute to the emerging debate on migrant housing in China. Existing studies on migrant housing are limited, and they are mostly empirical studies for specific cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen Wu, 2006; Zeng et al, 2009 ). In comparison, this study not only includes an empirical analysis with a greater geographical coverage but also conducts a theoretical analysis of migrant housing provision and provides policy recommendations. In the following sections we first conduct a conceptual analysis on how to provide shelter to migrants during rapid urbanization, considering both lessons from international experiences and the unique nature of the housing system in China. We then empirically study the existing migrant housing provision system and its impact on migrant housing conditions. On the basis of both conceptual and empirical analysis, we propose a multiagent migrant housing provision system with a related reform agenda.
(2) Urban villages were previously administrative villages in suburbs, which are increasingly engulfed by urban expansion. Land in these villages is still collectively owned by village collectives, which is different from urban land that is owned by the state. (3) Public rent housing is subsidized rental housing that has been promoted by the government since 2010, targeting mainly lower-middle-income households with housing difficulties such as new employees and qualified migrants (MOHURD, 2010).
Housing migrants during rapid urbanization: a conceptual analysis
Housing the urban poor has long been a challenge for policy makers worldwide. As the 'second wave' of rapid urbanization is taking place in developing countries, massive rural-to-urban migration has further exacerbated the challenge of housing the urban poor. According to UN-Habitat (2003) , urbanization will bring another 2 billion people into cities in developing countries in the next three decades, while 46% of current urban population in developing countries already lives in slums. Recently, the Habitat Agenda has aimed to provide adequate shelter for all in the urbanizing world, and the Millennium Development Goals called for a significant improvement in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 (Jenkins et al, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2003) . While the goal is clear, the road map is not obvious, especially for China where the volume of migrants is unprecedentedly large and the institutional discrimination against migrants is deeply embedded not just in the housing system but also in the labor market, education, and health care systems. How to provide decent and affordable housing to a large number of migrants in China imposes an unprecedented challenge. The rapidly rising housing prices and acute housing poverty in Chinese cities indicate that so far China has not been able to provide sufficient and decent affordable housing to the hundreds of millions of rural migrants. This calls for the active role of the government, innovative programs in the formal and informal market, and effective public-private partnership (PPP).
The role of the government
Because of market failure, scholars have long argued for an indispensable role of the government in low-income housing (eg, Arnott, 1987; 1989; 2009; Quigley, 1997; Wheaton 1990) , even in the most market-oriented economies. For example, since the US government declared its goal of providing a decent home for every American family in 1949, the federal government has since funded more than 5 million units of low-income housing, provided rental vouchers to another 2 million families, and provided massive funds for local governments to develop their own housing programs (Jaffe and Quigley, 2007; Schwartz, 2006) . In Europe the government plays an even more important role with a much larger share of social housing (eg, 36% in the Netherlands in 1994 and 31% in the UK in 1979, but the share has declined significantly in recent decades, to 19% in 1995) , and much larger subsidies to private renters than in the US (Hills, 2007; Laferrere and Le Blanc, 2006) . In Latin America public housing and governmentaided self-build housing were perceived as a strategy to stabilize labor and create a skilled working middle class (Burgess, 1992; Jenkins et al, 2007; Renaud, 1981; Wakely, 1988) . In Asia the heavy involvement of the government in Singapore and Hong Kong and their phenomenal housing success (Ramesh, 2003) , in contrast to the lack of the government in India and consequent large number of slum dwellers (Government of India, 1997), demonstrates again the importance of and the need for the government in low-income housing. Even though there is a recent retreat of the government in housing under neoliberalism, " government intervention is still necessary to achieve social change, meet housing need, and improve housing conditions" (Murie and Rowlands, 2008, page 647) . Given the sheer volume of migrants and their poor housing condition in Chinese cities, theoretically the Chinese government should be more involved in migrant housing than governments elsewhere. Yet, so far the Chinese government has played virtually no role in migrant housing. This is a result of many factors including the persistent hukou system, the dual land system, and public finance system. The devastating effect of the hukou system on migrants' housing choice and condition has been well documented (eg, Solinger, 1999; Wang et al, 2010; Wu, 2004; Zeng et al, 2009) . In a nutshell, owing to the lack of local registration in destination cities, migrants do not qualify for subsidized housing. Thus they have to live in private housing on the market, often temporary housing such as factory dorms and poor-quality private rental housing by individual families mainly in urban villages, forming slum-like settlements called 'migrant enclaves'. In addition, there are serious distortions in the land and housing market due to the dual land system and the existing public finance system. It has been well documented that, since the fiscal reform in 1994, local governments have kept an increasingly smaller share of tax income while shouldering increasingly larger fiscal responsibility for public services and welfare benefits (Lin and Yi, 2011; Man, 2010; Su and Tao, 2010; Tsui and Wang, 2004) . As the de facto landowner and the sole land proprietors to convert rural land into urban land (Ho and Lin, 2003; 2004) , local governments have turned this monopolistic power into a revenue-generating business, and have depended on landrelated revenues such as land conveyance fees to meet their budgetary needs.
(4) Thus, local governments have few incentives to provide subsidized housing to migrants, since this would not only reduce the residential land leasing revenue but also increase local spending in public housing construction and management. To maximize land leasing revenue, local governments undersupply residential land . This accounts in part for the skyrocketing land and housing prices in Chinese cities, which in turn encourages developers to provide expensive 'commodity housing' (shang pin fang) for sale instead of affordable rental housing.
We argue that the Chinese government should fully recognize its responsibility in improving migrant housing. The central question is not 'whether', but rather 'how', the government should be involved in migrant housing. One of the central questions is what level of government should undertake the task. From the perspective of fiscal federalism, the central government is better positioned to undertake the broad-based redistributive policy to generate less welfare-induced migration, while local governments are better informed about local conditions and thus can target the needy households better (Zenou, 2012) . In Europe housing has been seen as a fundamental part of national social policy (Whitehead, 1999) , while in the US broad-based policy and programs are set up and funded by the federal government, but mainly administered at the local level (Schwartz, 2006) . Given the fact that local governments in China are not even committed to low-income housing for urban households with local registration (Huang, 2012) , the central government should play a leading role in setting up and funding housing programs for migrants. Meanwhile, there are huge regional variations in the volume and profile of migrants, and local governments are better positioned to serve their migrants. Thus an incentive system needs to be established to encourage local governments to provide affordable housing to migrants. In Chongqing migrants with stable residence and social security are allowed to access subsidized housing in the same way as local urban residents (CMG, 2007) . This exemplifies the proactive role of local governments and the feasibility of including migrants in low-income housing programs.
Another question is about how to provide housing subsidy to migrants. To avoid social problems such as concentrated poverty and high crime rates that are widespread in large public housing developments, many countries have shifted housing subsidies from the 'supply side' to the 'demand side' (eg, Dreier and Atlas, 1995; Massey and Denton, 1993; Schwartz, 2006) . Instead of building low-income housing, increasingly the government provides subsidies to low-income households which in turn rent housing on the market, such as the voucher program in the US which has been shown to be more efficient and beneficial (Olsen, 2003; Schwartz, 2006) . Given the lack of affordable housing on the market and high mobility among migrants, both 'demand-side' and 'supply-side' subsidies are probably needed. Yet, even for supply-side subsidies, new technologies and strategies such as mixed-income, mixed-tenure housing development can be adopted to avoid potential social problems.
The formal and informal housing market
While important, the government alone cannot possibly provide sufficient housing to all low-income households. In fact, governments in most developing countries are neither effective nor efficient as housing providers (Berner, 2001) . Thus, the housing market, formal or informal, is needed to meet the large housing demand during rapid urbanization. Formal housing refers to housing built according to government rules, controls, and regulations, often by developers (Sivam, 2003) , while informal housing is built defying the minimum standards of housing regulations, and it is often characterized by insecurity of tenure and low standards of or lack of access to basic infrastructure and services (Sivam, 2003; Tsenkova, 2009) . In China formal housing refers to housing by developers, public employers, and local governments, while informal housing refers to mainly housing by urban villagers who have built housing on collectively owned land, which is characterized by a lack of public services, instability of tenure, and the violation of construction regulations. (5) With incentives and subsidies from the government, developers have played important roles in providing affordable housing to the urban poor (Olsen, 2003; Schwartz, 2006) . As government subsidies increasingly shift towards the demand side, developers have provided an increasingly larger share of affordable housing to the poor through such programs as the voucher program and low-income housing tax credit program. With inclusionary zoning, developers are also required to provide a certain amount of low-income housing in their housing developments. Despite the involvement of both the government and developers, few developing countries are able to provide adequate housing to the growing urban population during rapid urbanization. Informal housing has thus played a very important role in sheltering the urban poor in developing countries, accommodating 30-70% of urban population in developing countries (Durand-Lasserve, 1997, page 11) and accounting for about 64% of the housing stock in low-income countries (UNCHS, 1996, page 200) . The role of informal housing in developing countries is "fundamental rather than marginal" (Berner, 2000, page 2).
In Chinese cities the formal rental housing market is very much underdeveloped. With high profit margins in the owned sector and uncertainty in the housing market, developers have focused on upscale commodity housing for sale, and are unwilling to invest in the rental sector. The very limited rental housing by developers is often high-end hotel-style apartments for the elite. Recently, the Chinese government adopted the concept of 'matched development' (pei jian, or inclusionary housing), which requires developers to build a small proportion of low-income housing in their new housing developments (MOHURD, 2007; 2009) , mainly in low-end private housing such as Economic and Comfortable Housing (ECH).
(6) Yet, since 2007, when ECH was redefined as low-income housing, its development has declined sharply (Huang, 2012) , which means that the amount of low-income rental housing in ECH developments is very limited. Furthermore, this low-income rental housing is available to only urban households with local registration. Thus, developers and the formal housing market have played virtually no role in migrant housing. The question is how to mobilize developers to provide affordable housing to migrants.
In contrast, the informal housing market has been essential to migrants in Chinese cities. With collectively owned land in urban villages, suburban villagers have been constructing (5) Housing developed by rural collectives on collectively owned land, the so-called 'small property rights housing' (xiao chan quan fang), is considered illegal by the government, and its property rights are not guaranteed. (6) ECH is subsidized owned housing provided by developers on free or cheap land allocated by local municipal governments, sold to qualified households with government-controlled prices. ECH offers only partial property rights, which constrains homeowners to freely release it on the market for profit.
housing for leasing.
(7) Yet, with the threat of being demolished by the local government, villagers often expand their housing floor space by building higher and denser to maximize rent income, but they are unwilling to invest heavily to improve the quality of housing and infrastructure. Extreme crowding, unsafe housing conditions, unpaved roads, and uncollected garbage are common in urban villages. Urban villages are often considered by local governments as 'urban cancers' that should be demolished to facilitate urban development. Recently, scholars have argued for the importance of urban villages in providing affordable housing to migrants (Song et al, 2008; Wang et al, 2010; Zeng et al, 2009; Zhang et al, 2003) . Urban villages in China have served similar roles as ethnic enclaves in American cities-providing affordable housing and social support to new migrants (Ma and Xiang, 1998 )-and they may provide an alternative model to housing the urban poor in developing countries . Because of the dual land system, the contesting issue is how to reform urban villages to maintain or even expand the stock of affordable housing, improve housing quality and infrastructure, and at the same time protect villagers' economic interests.
The role of employers
In the West employers have generally played no role in providing housing to their employees, with the exception of company towns and large multinational corporations. Yet research shows that there are both economic and social benefits for employers to provide housing. By providing housing, employers can lower transaction costs, enhance productivity, reduce turnover rates, improve workers' health, and boost workers' morale (Fishback, 1992; Melling, 1980; Williamson, 1985) , as well as exert labor control to prevent strikes and other undesirable behaviors (Balnave, 2003; Fenley, 1993) . Providing housing by employers has also been considered a strategic effort to improve company image or attract talent (Braun and Warner, 2002; Williamson, 1985) . In the wake of demographic change and a mismatch of skills, 31% of employers worldwide experience difficulties in filling vacancies, and 'a war for talent' is waged, especially in certain countries and industries (Collett and Sitek, 2008) . It is common practice in the West for employers to obtain visas and citizenship for their migrant workers, especially in the high-tech sector. Providing housing assistance to migrants is considered one of the key roles that employers can play in attracting and integrating migrant workers (Collett and Sitek, 2008) .
In China employers were the primary housing provider during the socialist era. While employers have increasingly withdrawn from housing provision, they continue to play important, although different, roles in housing during the reform era. For example, in the early years of housing reform, employers were the dominant purchasers of commodity housing, who in turn sold newly purchased housing units to their employees at subsidized prices (Wu, 1996) . Even after the official end of public housing provision in 1998 (State Council, 1998) , many employers such as universities and government agencies have continued to either purchase commodity housing in bulk from developers or build subsidized housing for their employees. Many employers have also used subsidized housing to attract talent in recent years. Furthermore, most public and many large private employers are required by the government to establish a compulsory Housing Provident Fund (HPF) for their employees, in which employers match employees' savings for future housing consumption.
(8) (7) There is a dual land system in China, with rural land owned by rural collectives, and urban land owned by the state. Rural households are allowed to access a plot of collectively owned land in their village for housing construction mainly for self-occupancy. But in urban villages it is common that households build more housing to rent. (8) HPF is a compulsory saving account, with part of an employee's monthly paycheck (at least 5%) and a matching amount from employers deposited each month. It can be used for purchasing, rent, or remodeling housing.
In other words, despite the fact that employers are increasingly for-profit entities, employerprovided housing subsidies continue in the reform era mainly as a result of the socialist legacy and the lack of housing affordability among most urban households. (9) Employers also play important roles in migrant housing. Compared with local urban residents who have received a massive amount of housing subsidy during the privatization of public housing (Huang and Clark, 2002; Huang and Jiang, 2009; Logan et al, 2010; Wang and Murie, 2000) , migrants' housing affordability is even lower, as they do not receive any housing subsidy and their income is generally lower. Together with the lack of affordable housing on the market, employers, especially those in manufacturing and services, have to provide subsidized shelters to their migrant workers, often through dormitories or on-site shelters. In 1997 50% of migrants in Beijing stayed in work-related housing and one third of migrants in Shanghai lived in dormitories (Wu, 2002) . Furthermore, some employers require their migrant workers to live in dorms to facilitate exploitation and management (Lee, 1998) . With China aging rapidly and the rising cost of labor, employers in China are also experiencing difficulties attracting skilled migrant workers. Thus, decent housing by employers may become an important strategy for them to attract and keep skilled workers. Employers, especially those in the high-tech sector, help their skilled migrant workers obtain local registration ), which in turn helps migrants to access subsidized housing and formal housing.
Compared with subsidized housing by the government and private housing on the market, employer-provided housing seems to fall into neither category. Thus employers serve as a unique provider of affordable housing, which does not seem to be common in other developing countries. The importance of employers in low-income housing in China is further demonstrated by the central government's call for employers to provide more affordable and decent housing to migrants (State Council, 2007) . We argue that employers should continue to provide affordable housing to migrant workers due to not only its necessity (9) Owing to the rapidly rising housing price, housing in Chinese cities is considered 'severely unaffordable', with price-income ratio equaling 5.5:7 in 2007 (Man, 2010) . as a result of the lack of affordable housing for low-income migrants but also the economic benefits employers enjoy such as high productivity and low turnover rate. Meanwhile, the government should couple its call for employers to provide migrant housing with incentives such as cheaper land and tax deduction.
The international experience and the sheer volume of migrants in Chinese cities indicate the need for the government, the formal and informal housing market, and employers to work together to provide decent and affordable housing to migrants in China. A diversified housing provision system with the active involvement of the government, a functioning formal and informal housing market, and an expanded role of employers will ensure a large stock of affordable housing for migrants, and consequent improvement in their housing condition.
The state of migrant housing provision in Chinese cities: an empirical analysis
To complement the conceptual analysis, we conduct an empirical analysis of migrant housing provision. In 2009 we conducted a random survey of 2400 migrants in twelve cities in four major urbanized regions in China (figure 1).
(10) The survey collected information on migrants' various aspects of life, including demography, employment, income, housing, health, and social network. Migrants come from thirty-one provinces and municipalities, with Sichuan, Shandong, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei Provinces as the top-five origins (see table 1 for their basic characteristics). There are slightly more male than female migrants, and most of them are young, have high school or lower education, and come from the countryside with agricultural hukou. Yet, surprisingly, more than 62% of migrants are married, and more than 20% have been migrants for over ten years, another 19% for between six and ten years, and one third for between two and five years. Clearly, most migrants are no longer 'temporary' or 'single', which demonstrates the urgent need to provide affordable long-term housing to migrants and their families in cities.
According to table 2, 56% of migrants lived in private housing provided by the market, 35% lived in employer-provided dorms, and another 9% lived in other types of housing. Among those in private housing, 42% were in informal rental housing, most likely in urban villages, (11) and only 14% were in formal housing, mostly formal rental such as rented (10) The four regions are the Yangtze River Delta (Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province), the Pearl River Delta (PRD) (Guangdong Province), Chengdu-Chongqing region (Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality), and Bohai Bay Area (Hebei and Shandong Province). We randomly selected one megalopolis (more than 1 million population), one large city (500 000-1 million), and one small or medium-sized city (<500 000) in each of the four urbanized regions, which resulted in twelve cities (Ninbo and Yueqing in Zhejiang Province; Jiangyin in Jiangsu Province; Yanjiao town in Hebei Province; Jinan and Weifang in Shandong Province; Guangzhou, Zhongshan, and Dongguan in Guangdong Province; and Chongqing, Nancong, and Chengdu in Sichuan Province). Owing to a large volume of migrants in the megalopolis, we focused on one district with a large number of migrants, while in smaller cities we used all districts in the city as our sampling frame. Then we randomly selected 200 migrants in each city from the migrant registration list provided either by the local Public Security Bureau or by the local government migrant administrative agency. While not all migrants are registered, the registration rate ranges from about 70% of migrants in Guangdong Province to 90% in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province. If the sampled migrant has already moved away, we continued the systematic random sampling until we reach the desired sample size. The percentage of replacement due to unavailability of the originally sampled migrants ranges between 15% and 30% for cities. Migrants are defined as people whose hukou is not registered in the city they live in at the time of survey, and they have left their hukou registration places for more than three days. The adoption of the 'three-day' criteria is based on the current policy that migrants who have left their home towns for more than three days are required to apply for a temporary registration card (zan zhu zheng).
(11) While the survey does not clearly differentiate private housing (si fang) and self-built housing in urban villages, it is fair to assume that most is located in urban villages. Total 100.0 commodity housing, rented economic housing, and 'reform housing' ( fang gai fang). (12) It is obvious that the informal housing market and employers were the main housing providers for migrants, while the formal market played a limited role and the government played virtually no direct role in providing migrant housing. This provision system is unique and rather different from that in other countries where the government and the formal and informal markets provide migrant housing. With fewer than 4% of migrants owning their homes in the destination cities (compared with 70% of urban households in 2010), migrants have clearly been left far behind in pursuing the 'Chinese dream'. (13) According to table 3, married migrants are much more likely to live in informal rental and the formal housing sector than single migrants. While the latter are more likely to live in dorms, a sizable share of married migrants (23%) also live in dorms provided by employers, which indicates the poor housing condition of married migrants, on the one hand, and the importance of employers in migrant housing, on the other hand. Migrants with agricultural hukou are much more likely to live in informal rental housing and less likely to live in formal housing than those with nonagricultural hukou, although both are as likely to live in dorms. Migrants with a longer duration in cities are more likely to live in informal and formal housing by the market, while those with a shorter duration are much more likely to live in dorms. Not surprisingly, self-employed migrants cannot access dorms and have to rely on the market for housing, while those working for public employers are more likely to live in dorms than those working for private and individual employers. Comparing their first dwellings in the (12) Reform housing is previously public rental housing sold to sitting tenants at subsidized prices. Since migrants are not qualified for ECH and reform housing, the small number of migrants renting ECH and reform housing most likely rented subsidized housing from homeowners. (13) Migrants may own homes in their home towns. city with their current dwellings, migrants tend to move from employer-provided dorms, to informal rental housing, and then to formal rental and owned housing. This shows that migrants move up the housing ladder over time as they gain more social and financial capital. Employer-provided housing is important to virtually all migrants, especially newcomers, single migrants, and those lacking financial resources, despite the generally declining role of employers in housing provision during privatization.
Housing and neighborhood quality vary significantly across housing providers. On average, there are more than three persons per room (table 4). The dream of 'a room of one's own' (Huang, 2003) is still far beyond the reach of migrants. The average facility index is about 61 (on a scale of 0-100), and fewer than 50% have air conditioning or heating, indicating poor facilities in migrant housing. (14) Not surprisingly, formal housing (rental or owned) was the least crowded and best facilitated, followed by informal rental housing and then dorms. Neighborhood quality is measured mainly using accessibility to major services, public transit and jobs, and environment quality.
(15) On average, migrants live relatively close to major services (1.8 km), public transit (2.9 stations within 1 km away from home), and their jobs (with a one-way commute taking 7.9 minutes and 1.5 km in distance). Their neighborhood environment is decent, being 4 on a 1-5 scale. Not surprisingly, migrants living in formal housing have the best accessibility and neighborhood environment, even though they, especially homeowners, have the longest commute. The conventional trade-off between better housing and neighborhoods and longer commutes seems to be true among migrants. Migrants living in dorms have similar accessibility to those in informal rentals; yet the former have shorter commutes and, surprisingly, a better neighborhood environment. This again demonstrates the importance of employer-provided housing as one key option for migrants. (14) The facility index is based on the presence and condition of tap water, toilets, bath facilities, kitchens, and fuel for cooking. Each facility is assigned a number on a range of 0-100. For tap water, toilets, bath facilities, and kitchen, 0 is for no facilities, 50 is for shared facilities, and 100 is for private use. For cooking fuel type, 100 is for piped gas, 50 for canned gas or electricity, and 0 for others. The facility index is the average of these numbers, in the range 0-100, with 100 indicating the best facilities. (15) The average distance to major services such as shopping centers and malls, grocery stores, theaters and recreational facilities, schools, and hospitals is calculated. The environment quality index (scaled 1-5) is based on the presence (1 versus 0) of exercise facilities for adults, children's playgrounds, paved roads, street lights, garbage collection, and the condition of sanitation and noise. Housing affordability is a major problem among migrants, and it also varies across housing providers. According to table 5, migrants generally pay 216 yuan (US$31.76) per month for housing and another 73 yuan (US$10.74) for utilities, which together account for about 14% of their nonagricultural income.
(16) Compared with the 30% threshold in the West, (17) housing affordability does not seem to be an acute problem for migrants in Chinese cities. Yet, the extremely crowded and poor housing condition clearly show that migrants have lowered their standards of housing consumption to save money. Surprisingly, renters have higher cost burdens (19-20%) than homeowners (15%), and migrants are predominately renters. In particular, while migrants in informal rental housing pay much less for their housing than those in formal rental and owned housing, their cost burden is high. This shows that migrants in informal rental arrangements have very low income and they depend on affordable housing in the informal rental sector. At the same time, their high cost burden would 'discount' their spending on other essentials such as food and health care, and thus have significant health impact (Cheer et al, 2002) . In contrast, migrants living in dorms understandably have the lowest cost burden, which again demonstrates the importance of employer-provided housing to low-income migrants.
The above empirical analyses show that millions of migrants in Chinese cities have not enjoyed the dazzling housing improvement as much as urban households. In addition to their generally low income, the distorted migrant housing provision system is mainly to blame: employers and the informal housing market are the main housing providers, while the formal housing market plays a very small role and the government is entirely invisible in migrant housing provision. While affordable, employer-provided dorms are extremely crowded, with poor facilities, and they are not appropriate for migrant families. In comparison, the informal rental housing is less crowded, but not only is poor quality but also imposes a high cost burden on migrants. This demonstrates the urgency to reform the current housing provision system for migrants in order to improve their housing conditions. A government-led multiagent provision system: policy design and reform agenda The above conceptual and empirical analyses provide some foundations for policy design and reform. Given the sheer size of migrants in China, no single channel can provide millions of migrants and their families with adequate, affordable, and decent housing. A multiagent provision system with the government, the market, and employers working together is required (figure 2). While migration is a national issue, housing provision is ultimately a (16) An exchange rate of 6.8 is used for 2009. (17) In the US, if a household spends more than 30% of its income on housing, housing affordability is considered a problem (eg, Hulchanski, 1995; Kutty, 2005) . local matter. Thus local governments are instrumental in migrant housing provision. Yet, so far, local governments lack commitment to low-income housing, in general, and migrant housing, in particular (Huang, 2012) . We argue that the central government has to shift its focus from regulating the high-end housing market to foster the affordable housing market, especially migrant housing, and mobilize local governments as well as the market and employers through reforms and financial tools to massively expand and diversify their provision of migrant housing. First of all, the central government has to recognize migrants' housing rights in cities, and issue policies to gradually incorporate migrants into the formal housing system. As urban households have significantly improved their housing consumption in recent decades, the focus of the central government should be shifted towards migrants to improve their housing condition and facilitate their assimilation into the urban society. While the Chinese government may not be ready to fully get rid of the hukou system, qualified migrants should be entitled to housing subsidies as many migrants have lived and worked in cities for years as de facto urban residents. Subsidized rental and owned housing should be gradually accessible to low-middle-income migrants. Instead of using household registration status as the prerequisite, as is the case now, housing affordability and urban residence should be considered as the main qualifications for housing subsidies-for example, more than 30% of income for average market rent and a minimum of five years of continuous residence and stable employment in a city, with room for local adjustment.
Second, the central government should reform the land system to ensure sufficient land for affordable housing, in general, and migrant housing, in particular, each year. In recent years the central government has issued yearly land quotas for subsidized housing, mainly for urban residents. Similarly, the central government should require local governments to devote a certain proportion of land to migrant housing. In addition, and probably more importantly, the central government should grant collectively owned rural land similar property rights as state-owned urban land, and allow the former to enter the land and housing market directly without first being converted to urban land by the local government. This will break the monopolized land supply by local governments and significantly increase the land supply for housing development. With massive profits from their land tenure, urban villagers will be motivated to invest heavily in decent housing, which will not only massively increase the stock of affordable housing but also drastically improve the housing condition in urban villages. Local practices in China indicate the feasibility of this reform. For example, in the PRD, where local governments' control over residential land market is less tight, there is a massive supply of affordable housing by urban villages. Around 50% of migrants in the PRD live in rental housing in urban villages, and in Shenzhen 48% of all housing in the city belongs to original village residents, according to the Shenzhen Municipal Housing Construction Plan 2006 (Shenzhen Municipal Housing, 2006 . Even in places where local governments have a tight control of the land market such as Beijing, urban villagers still build a large amount of 'illegal' housing as a counterplot against the government's monopoly of the land market (Liu et al, 2012) . While the original village residents increase their income by leasing their properties to migrants, local governments charge 5-10% of their rental incomes as migrant administration fees. Thus, allowing urban villagers to participate in housing development has many benefits including financial gains for both villagers and local governments, a large stock of decent and affordable housing, and potentially lower housing prices due to a larger supply of residential land (Tao and Wang, 2010; Zhang, 2009) .
Third, the central government should use various financial tools to mobilize the market and employers to provide migrant housing. For example, the central government should require state-owned banks to provide low-interest long-term loans and local governments to provide cheaper land to any organization to develop migrant housing. This would encourage those with fewer resources, such as small developers and urban villagers, to invest in low-end housing and rental housing, thus massively expanding the stock of affordable housing for not only migrants but also low-income urban households.
Fourth, the central government should use financial incentives to mobilize local governments in migrant housing provision. For example, the central government should provide an annual budget for migrant housing. Similar to the massive fund for Cheap Rental Housing (Huang, 2012) , the central government should set up a program-specific fund for migrant housing, helping local governments finance migrant housing or provide subsidies to migrants. While it is impractical to expect any government to provide a massive volume of migrant housing, the international experience also indicates that the market alone is unlikely to provide sufficient affordable housing to a large number of migrants during rapid urbanization. Thus the central government has to take the lead and encourage local governments to provide migrant housing. Since the main challenge lies in large cities where most migrants move to and housing is the most expensive, the central government can either focus on main destination cities for migrants or allocate its budget based on the volume of migrants in each city.
More importantly, the central government has to reform the public finance system to help local governments finance migrant housing (figure 3). Currently, the central government takes the lion's share of local revenue while local governments shoulder the majority of public services including subsidized housing. This has forced local governments to rely on the land for additional revenue, such as converting rural-to-urban land with extremely low compensation to villagers and leasing urban land to developers with handsome land conveyance fees. These practices encourage local governments to demolish urban villages and old neighborhoods where most affordable housing is located, on the one hand, and limit residential land supply to artificially increase land conveyance fees, thus resulting in higher housing prices, on the other hand. The central government has to allow local governments to keep a much larger share (eg, 75%) of their budgetary revenue. Furthermore, local governments should be allowed to have more diversified revenue sources other than land-related revenues, such as collecting land value-added tax, property tax, and rental income tax. In particular, property tax, which is being experimented with for high-end housing in cities such as Shanghai, should be implemented broadly, and become a main source of local governments' revenue as is the case in most Western cities. These long-term revenues, together with rent from migrant housing provided by the government, should replace the lump-sum 'land revenue', part of which can be used to subsidize housing for the poorest migrants.
Finally, to ensure local governments' commitment, the central government has to set up clear goals for migrant housing, and establish an accountability mechanism. Local governments have generally resisted the central government's call for low-income housing due to conflicting interests (Huang, 2012) . Since 2010, the central government has mandated local governments to develop a targeted amount of affordable housing, and has included local governments' performance in its evaluation system, which has since spurred a new wave of low-income housing development. A similar accountability mechanism should also be in place for migrant housing.
While the regulatory framework and financial incentives by the central government are important, local municipal governments are instrumental in migrant housing provision. First of all, per the requirement of the central government, local municipal governments have to allow urban villagers to participate directly in the land and housing market (instead of demolishing urban villages and converting rural land into urban land for high-end housing development). In addition, local governments can draw on successful practices of land readjustment in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Hong and Needham, 2007) to ensure decent infrastructure and services in urban villages. Such land readjustment schemes are typically initiated by the municipal government, with a portion of the designated land sold via public auction for commercial activities to fund the provision of infrastructure and services in the area, while the rest of the reorganized land belongs to the original landowners who now own a smaller piece of land but have access to better infrastructure and services. The underlying economics can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume an urban village owns one hundred units of land. During the course of redevelopment, the local government negotiates directly with the village collective. After calculating the potential value added to the property after the redevelopment, the government can requisite forty-five units of land from villagers, Notes: 1 = cheap land, tax breaks; 2 = land readjustment, full property rights for collectively owned land. among which thirty units can be used for infrastructure development and the remaining fifteen units can be sold via public auction to cover the cost of infrastructure construction. While villagers have given up forty-five units of land, they own the remaining fifty-five units, which now have much higher value due to better infrastructure, and they are allowed to develop housing with higher floor-area ratios. Through PPPs, this land readjustment practice can be an effective way to finance urban development. It would help to generate multiple residential land suppliers, and ensure an adequate supply of rental housing for migrants with decent infrastructure and public services, while at the same time local governments would still be able to obtain some land for urban public development without incurring additional costs and raise some tax revenues from rental incomes to finance other public services. In addition, such land reforms also encourage developers to provide low-end and middle-end housing since there would be more and cheaper land available for housing development.
Second, local governments should be required to allocate part of their annual budget to migrant housing, to match the central government's program-specific fund. As both the central and local governments are pumping money into low-income housing for urban households (Huang, 2012) , it is unjustified not to do the same for millions of migrants. Instead of providing massive subsidies to middle-income urban households who can afford multiple homes (Huang and Yi, 2010; , local governments should focus on low-income migrant and urban households. We argue that both supply-side and demand-side subsidies should be provided to migrants. The supply-side subsidy can not only increase the stock of low-income housing but also provide better housing and neighborhood quality with formal planning and the involvement of large developers, while the demand-side subsidy can offer migrants the needed flexibility and mobility for their employment.
Third, local governments should provide incentives such as cheap land, tax breaks, and low-interest loans to employers to encourage them to provide affordable housing to migrants. Even though employers are increasingly private and for-profit entities, they continue to provide housing and housing subsidies to their employees, as demonstrated by our empirical analysis. With increasingly acute labor shortages, especially in coastal cities, decent and affordable employer-provided housing may help employers to attract skilled migrant workers. In China more than half of migrants are employed in manufacturing sectors. In the regional competition for industrial investment, local governments have been giving free or extremely cheap land to manufacturers such that industrial land is often not used intensively. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources of China, the average floor-area ratios for industrial parks are only 0.3-0.6, half the level of other developing countries. Therefore, when environmental conditions are appropriate, manufacturers should be encouraged to utilize their vacant industrial land to build housing for their migrant employees. For example, in the city of Yueqing in Zhejiang Province employers developed large-scale apartment complexes for migrants on land provided by the local government.
While dorms currently dominate employer-provided housing, we argue for a more diversified housing provision by employers. On the supply side, in addition to dorms, large and resourceful employers should be encouraged to build affordable apartments for their migrant employees, as families are increasingly common among migrants. On the demand side, in addition to monetary subsidies, local governments should require all employers to provide a compulsory HPF to their employees, including migrants, to help them purchase or rent housing on the market. Individual employers can set up their own criteria such as years of employment and income level for migrants to access that housing subsidies.
Fourth, local governments should provide similar incentives in land, taxes, and loans to encourage developers to provide affordable migrant housing. Currently, with the land supply being monopolized by the local government, and consequently high housing prices, developers in China have focused on high-end housing for higher profit margins. If local governments could provide cheaper land but require developers to provide affordable housing, many developers would follow suit despite there being a low profit margin. The massive supply of land by urban villages would also encourage developers to move into low-end housing. There is no doubt that local governments would consequently suffer revenue loss due to the loss of land conveyance fees. However, such loss can be partly offset by increasing tax revenue from stronger land and housing development activities. The inclusionary housing practice in Chinese cities focuses on subsidized housing mainly for urban low-income households. It needs to be expanded to include migrant housing.
Conclusion and discussion
Since the Chinese government relaxed migration control in the 1980s, there has been no turning back the tidal wave of migrants into Chinese cities. While enjoying migrants' economic contribution, the Chinese government has virtually been free of responsibilities for migrants' welfare. Yet, the current practice of denying migrants' rights to the city is no longer politically and practically justified. How to accommodate the massive influx of migrants with decent and affordable housing has become an urgent task for the government to ensure political stability and to facilitate further urbanization.
The conceptual analysis demonstrates the need for a functioning formal and informal housing market, a unique role of employers, and the active involvement of the government in providing shelter to the large number of migrants. The empirical analysis reveals that migrants in Chinese cities mostly live in the informal housing in urban villages and employer-provided dorms with poor housing conditions, while the formal housing market and the government play virtually no role in migrant housing. Thus we argue for a government-led multiagent housing provision system in which the central government sets up clear goals and mobilizes both the public and private agents to massively expand the provision of migrant housing. On the one hand, the central government should ensure local governments' commitment in migrant housing through both profound reforms and financial incentives, such as reforming the public finance system to allow local government to keep a larger share of budgetary revenue and diversify their revenue sources, and allocating program-specific funding for migrant housing, while creating an accountability mechanism. On the other hand, the central government and the local government should work together to mobilize developers, urban villages, and employers to provide migrant housing through incentives such as low-interest loans, cheap land, and tax breaks and reforms in the land and housing system. In particular, the government should allow collectively owned land in urban villages to enter the land and housing market directly, adopt innovative practices such as land readjustment in urban villages to fund urban development, allow employers to use vacant industrial land for housing development, and require developers to provide migrant housing through inclusionary housing. These will result in a large supply of affordable housing with good infrastructure and services for migrants. To a certain degree this also reduces the pressure on local governments to provide a large amount of housing to migrants.
While it is probably not feasible to fully get rid of the hukou system overnight, it is important to design and implement a housing system that provides affordable housing to migrants to ensure their share of the housing success in China. We believe the proposed migrant housing provision system and related reforms could generate a large supply of affordable housing for migrants. In the long run, the migrant housing provision system should be gradually combined with the urban housing provision system, with migrants enjoying the same housing options and housing rights as urban residents. In so doing, permanent migration would be achieved, which itself would imply the gradual phase-out of the hukou system and related socioeconomic discrimination against migrants.
